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NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Initial
Thoughts About Second-Generation
Rights
CharlesH. Brower it
ABSTRACT

In this Article ProfessorBrower argues that most observers
of NAFTA's investment chapter have missed an important and
surprising development: Although the treaty's text shares a
philosophical affinity with civil and political rights, its
application has revealed an astonishing level of support for
economic and social rights (ESCRs) in North America. Professor
Brower examines the practical implications of this development
both for the presentation of claims in investor-state arbitration
and for the better integrationof ESCRs into the mainstream of
internationallaw.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Debates swirling around the North American Free Trade
Agreement's (NAFTA's) investment chapter (Chapter 11)1 manifest
clashes among political, economic, and social values. Many observers
describe Chapter 11 as a front in the struggle between trade and the
environment. 2 Others view it as the setting for a dramatic conflict
between sovereignty and the rule of law.3 While a few writers have

1.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, ch.
11 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2.
See, e.g., HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS
ON THE ENVIRONMENT 60 (1999) (identifying a conflict between "the reality" of Chapter
11 and "the ability to protect the environment"); Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The
Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest
for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 132 (2003)
(recounting the "common charge" that Chapter 11 claims "will deter beneficial ...
environmental regulation"); Steve Charnovitz, Reflections on North American
Environmental Cooperation, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 489, 495 (2002) (stating that "[a]mong
environmentalists today, Chapter 11 is perceived as the biggest threat in NAFTA to
the environment"); Janine Ferretti, NAFTA and the Environment:An Update, 28 CAN.U.S. L.J. 81, 84 (2002) (explaining that Chapter 11 cases "represent the most current
and controversial area[ ] for NAFTA today" and "seem[ ] to confirm the fears ... of the
potential for paralysis in environmental protection caused by the trumping of
environmental regulation by trade rules"); Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article,
Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principlesand Lingering Doubts,
10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 247 (2002) (observing that the "majority" of expropriation
claims "concern environmental measures"); Terri L. Lilley, Note, Keeping NAFTA
"Green" for Investors and the Environment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 728 (2002)
(discussing the "[w]idespread concern . . . that the risk of crushing liability for
regulatory action will hamstring environmental regulation"); Howard Mann & Konrad
von Moltke, Protecting Investor Rights and the Public Good: Assessing NAFTA's
Investment Chapter 8 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Investment
Law and Sustainable Development Tri-National Policy Workshops), available at
http://www.iisd.org/trade/ilsdworkshop/pdflbackgrounden.pdf [hereinafter Mann &
von Moltke, Manuscript] (referring to a "growing sense that the provisions of Chapter
11 put at risk the ability of governments to maintain a dynamic environmental
management system").
3.
See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr.
Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 487 (2002); Charles H. Brower II, InvestorState Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
43, 81, 87-88 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, Empire Strikes Back]; see also Ari Afilalo,
Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 52 (2001) (identifying the "erosion of
sovereignty" as the 'lynchpin" of criticism against Chapter 11); Pierre Sauve, Canada,
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examined Chapter 11 from a human rights perspective, 4 virtually no
one has acknowledged its transformation into the vehicle for a
competition between civil and political rights (CPRs or liberty rights),
on one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCRs), on
the other. As a result, no one has recognized the unexpectedly high
level of support for ESCRs in North America, particularly in the
United States. Neither has anyone examined the implications of this
phenomenon, either narrowly for the presentation of investor-state
disputes, or more broadly for the better integration of ESCRs into the
mainstream of international law.
To fill these gaps in the literature, Part II of this article
examines the content and philosophical structure of CPRs and
ESCRs, as well as the United States' traditional hostility toward
ESCRs. Part III discusses the contributions that CPRs have made to
the text of NAFTA's investment chapter, as well as the contributions
that ESCRs have made to debates about its application. Finally, Part
IV explores the possible implications of the latter phenomenon both
for the presentation of investment disputes and for the better
incorporation of ESCRs into the mainstream of international law.

Free Trade, and the DiminishingReturns of HemisphericRegionalism, 4 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 244 (1999-2000) (stating that Chapter 11 "has come to be
viewed by many as posing a potentially serious threat to domestic regulatory
sovereignty"); Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA
Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 301, 319 (2003) (stating that
"[c]ritics in the United States and Canada complain the loudest that Chapter 11
threatens sovereignty"); Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers:Investor Claims and
Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 143-44 (2002)
(observing that Chapter 11 raises "provocative and timely questions about state
sovereignty," including "the ability of states to pursue domestic policy priorities
unconstrained by external authority structures or requirements"); Justin Byrne,
Comment, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing True Rule-Based Diplomacy
Through Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 432 (2000) (explaining that the "most
common critique leveled against the investor-state dispute mechanism is that it
undermines national sovereignty"); Gregory M. Starner, Note, Taking a Constitutional
Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States' Constitutional Protection
of Property, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 405, 405 (2002) (asserting that the "continued
debate turns on whether NAFTA represents a . . . step towards member countries
relinquishing their sovereignty to a regional trade regime" that functions as a "type of
regional constitution").
See Josd E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade
4.
Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 304-12 (1997)
[hereinafter Alvarez, Critical Theory]; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, International Law,
Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177, 196-97 (1997);
Symposium, The MultinationalEnterpriseas Global Corporate Citizen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (2001) (remarks by Jos6 Alvarez) [hereinafter Alvarez
Remarks]; see also Chantell Taylor, Note, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade
System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers' Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 401, 403, 408, 412 (2000) (examining Chapter 11 from the perspective of
international workers' rights).

1536

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 371533

II. CPRs AND ESCRs: TRADITIONAL VIEWS AND BIASES
When discussing human rights, scholars commonly recognize the
existence of a dichotomy (real or false) between CPRs and ESCRs. 5 To
ensure a basic understanding of CPRs and ESCRs, Part II(A)
examines traditional views about their content and philosophical
structure. Likewise, to provide a benchmark for evaluating the
significance of reactions to the application of NAFTA's investment
chapter, Part II(B) discusses the United States' longstanding record
of hostility toward ESCRs.
A. Content and PhilosophicalStructure
Following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the General Assembly in 1948,6 the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights (Commission) undertook the task of transforming that
set of aspirational, "common standard[s]" 7 into a series of binding
treaty obligations. 8 Almost two decades later, in 1966, the
Commission completed work on the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).9

5.
Compare HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 246 (2d ed. 2000) (identifying "many differences" between the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), with Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Security:
Can It Be Attained?, 97 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (forthcoming 2003) (referring to the
"long-standing' and "false" dichotomy between the two sets of rights), and Donna E.

Arzt, Law Students' Attitudes About Economic Rights in the Post Cold War World, 19
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 39, 40-41, 45 (1993) (referring to the "dichotomy in
international law between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic,
social and cultural rights on the other," but later suggesting that "the separation
reflects an artificial dichotomy"). See also STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 39-40 (1999) (identifying the
distinction "routinely drawn between negative rights and positive rights," and
explaining the differing roles that the two sets of rights contemplate for the state);
DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE'S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE STATE 2123 (1998) (examining the distinctions between welfare rights and liberty rights);

Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1981) (reviewing the historical development of "first" and
"second" generation rights).
6.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
7.
Id. pmbl.
8.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 138-39, 244-45 (stating that
"[a]fter the adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948, the next step was to
translate the rights it recognized . . . into binding treaty obligations," and describing
that process).
9.
The General Assembly adopted both Covenants simultaneously by
resolution in 1966. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also International Covenant
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Although neither treaty entered into force until 1976,10 each now
boasts more than 140 states parties."
Ever since their adoption, the United Nations has described the
rights contained in the ICCPR and the ICESCR as "universal,
indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated."'1 2 Even though their
preambles expressly reiterate this theme, 13 the ICCPR and the
IESCR identify rights and adopt language that reflect fundamentally
different (some would even say incompatible) 14 views about the
relationship between individuals and the states that they inhabit. For
example, the ICCPR draws on the "first generation" of rights
produced by the liberal philosophy of eighteenth-century Europe.15
Thus, the ICCPR prohibits torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest and
16
detention, as well as arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.
Likewise, it requires states parties to respect freedom of movement,
thought, religion, expression, and association, as well as the rights to
privacy and assembly. 17 When setting forth these principles, the

on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976
[hereinafter ICESCR].
10.
Id.
11.
As of this writing, 149 states have ratified the ICCPR, and an additional 8
states have signed but not ratified the ICCPR. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner of

Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal InternationalHuman Rights
Treaties 9 (May 2, 2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/
auob.htm. Likewise, 146 states have ratified the ICESCR, and an additional 7 states
have signed but not ratified it. Id.
12.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 237, 247; see also Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, Part I(5), 32 I.L.M. 1663, 1665 (1993); A.H. ROBERTSON &
J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 274 (4th ed. 1996); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (4th ed. 1997); Brigit Toebes, Towards an Improved
Understandingof the InternationalHuman Right to Health, 21 HuM. RTS. Q. 661, 661
(1999).
13.
See ICCPR, supra note 9, pmbl., cl. 4 (recognizing that "the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights"); ICESCR, supra
note 9, pmbl., cl. 3 (recognizing that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom
from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights").
14.
See KELLEY, supra note 5, at 21 ('Welfare rights are radically different from,
and incompatible with, the classical rights to life, liberty, and property."); Rosalyn
Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 495, 497 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) ("The dilemma is that full
achievement of... economic and social rights entails a loss of individual liberties which is
unacceptable to the western liberal democracies.").
15.
See Marks, supra note 5, at 437 (discussing the evolution of "firstgeneration" rights).
16.
See ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 6-9.
17.
See id. arts. 12, 17-19, 21-22.

1538

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 371533

ICCPR employs language that focuses attention on the individual
(e.g., "every human being," "no one," "everyone," "anyone," and "all
persons"). 18 One may, thus, conclude that the ICCPR restricts state
action in order to provide individuals with large zones of autonomy.
In other words, it uses "negative" rights to promote liberty. 19
In contrast, the ICESCR draws on the "second generation" of
rights produced by the socialist philosophies of nineteenth-century
Europe. 20 Thus, the ICESCR recognizes the rights to work under
favorable conditions, to social security, to adequate food and shelter,
and to the highest attainable standard of health, education, and
participation in cultural life. 2 1 Although writers commonly include
environmental protection in an emerging, "third generation" of
collective rights, 22 the rights to health and adequate food may also
require states to establish or maintain the environmental conditions
necessary for their exercise. 23 When setting forth these principles, the

18.
See id. arts. 6(1), 7, 8(1), 9(1)-(5), 10(1), 12(1)-(2), 17, 18(1)-(2), 19(1)-(2),
22(1); see also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 277-78 (discussing the
linguistic formulation of rights under the ICCPR); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at
246 (examining the terminology used in the ICCPR).
19.
See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 40 (observing that "[niegative
rights ban and exclude government" and that "[n]egative rights typically protect
liberty"); Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties'
Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 159 (1987) (noting that "civil and political rights are
characterized as negative in that they require only that governments should abstain
from activities that would violate them"); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics,
Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy Int'l L.) 21, 231 (1989IV) (explaining that "civil and political rights are often described as negative rights:
they are freedoms, immunities, which a State can respect by abstention, by leaving the
individual alone"); Marks, supra note 5, at 437-38, 441 (discussing the "first
generation" of "negative" rights, which "required the prohibition of interference by the
state in the freedom of the individual" and citing Karel Vasak's use of the first element
of the French Revolution's motto, "libert6," to describe the aim of first-generation
rights); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 122 (1991) (observing that the "first generation"
of rights "define[s] a sphere of personal liberties into which the government cannot
enter").
20.
See Marks, supra note 5, at 438 (discussing the evolution of "secondgeneration" rights); see also Louis Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights and Rights in
the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 25, 3334 (explaining that certain international human rights, which appeared "after various
socialisms were established and .. .the welfare state was nearly universal," require "a
government that is activist, intervening, committed to economic-social planning for the
society, so as to satisfy economic-social rights of the individual").
21.
See ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15.
22.
See ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 292-93; Henkin, supra note
19, at 244, 246-47; Marks, supra note 5, at 442-44; Justice Albie Sachs, Social and
Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?,53 SMU L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2000).
23.
See Henkin, supra note 19, at 246-47 (recognizing that because
environmental protection "is related to individual health and well-being," one may
argue that "a State party to the [ICESCRI is required to pursue a healthful
environment progressively to the extent of available resources as part of its [treaty]
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ICESCR employs language that focuses attention on the state (e.g.,
"States Parties . ..recognize," "States Parties .. .undertake," and
24
"[t]he steps to be taken by the States Parties ...shall include").
One may, thus, conclude that the ICESCR requires state action in

obligations"); see also Dinah Shelton, InternationalDecision, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 937, 942
n.35 (2002) ("In cases wlhere human rights instruments do not include a specific 'right
to environment,' . . . courts may nevertheless hold that existing environmental
conditions violate other rights.").
When interpreting or applying the rights to health and to adequate food, two
treaty-based institutions have concluded that those rights require states parties to take
specific measures to protect the environment. See Comm. on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standardof Health, gen. cmt. 14,
4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/
gencommI/econ.htm (interpreting the right to health to include "access to safe and
potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a
healthy environment"); id. 1 11 (interpreting the right to health to include "access to
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food ...
[and] . . .healthy occupational and environmental conditions"); id.
15 (concluding
that the right to health requires "an adequate supply of safe and potable water and
basic sanitation[, as well as] the prevention and reduction of the population's exposure
to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental
environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health"); id.
36 (concluding that the right to health requires states "to adopt measures against
environmental and occupational health hazards," including policies "aimed at reducing
and eliminating pollution of air, water and soil, including pollution by heavy metals
such as lead from gasoline"); id.
51 (concluding that "the failure to enact or enforce
laws to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil by extractive and manufacturing
industries" would violate the right to health); Comm'n on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Right to Adequate Food, gen. cmt. 12,
4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(2000), available at http://wwl.umn.eduhumanrts/gencomm.econ.htm (affirming that
the right to adequate food is "inseparable from . . . requiring the adoption of
appropriate ...

environmental . . . policies"); id.

10 (defining the core content of

adequate food to include "requirements for food safety ..,to prevent contamination of
foodstuffs through adulteration and/or through bad environmental hygiene"); see also
African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, Decision Regarding Communication
No. 155/96,
51 (May 27, 2002), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/africa
comcases/allcases.html (recognizing that environmental degradation harms physical
health); id.
52 (concluding that the right to health obligates states to "desist from
directly threatening the health and environment of their citizens"); id. 53 (asserting
that compliance with the "spirit" of the right to health requires states to order or
permit "independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments," to require and
publicize "environmental . . . impact studies prior to any major industrial
development," and to undertake monitoring of "those communities exposed to
hazardous materials"); id. 65 (concluding that the "minimum core of the right to food"
requires states neither to "destroy or contaminate food sources" nor to "allow private
parties to destroy or contaminate food sources").
Although the rights to health and adequate food may require a certain level of
environmental protection, the scope of that protection falls short of a general right to
the environment because "environmental degradation is not itself a cause for
complaint." Shelton, supra note 19, at 116.
24.
See ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 7, 8(1), 9, 11(1), 12, 15; see also
ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 278 (discussing the linguistic formulation of
obligations under the ICESCR); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 246 (examining
the terminology used in the ICESCR).
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order to provide individuals with a common minimum standard of
material well-being. 2 5 In other words, it uses "positive rights" to
promote equality.

26

Like the philosophies that produced them, the ICCPR and the
ICESCR share the goal of improving the human condition. At a very
general level, one can accept the two traditions as inseparable: Just
as freedom of thought has little value for those threatened with
starvation or exposure, food and shelter provide little comfort to those
who live in fear of extra-judicial killing or disappearance. 2 7 At a more
concrete level, the ICCPR and the ICESCR assign fundamentally
different roles to the state. While the former restrains state action,
intervention and reallocation of wealth, the latter demands it.28 Thus,
literally and figuratively, CPRs and ESCRs appear to be stuck in
different centuries.
B. Biases
Judged by the formal criterion of ratification, the international
community has shown overwhelming and virtually identical support
for the ICCPR and ICESCR. 29 As a practical matter, however, states
30
parties have shown much greater concern for CPRs than for ESCRs.

25.
See KELLEY, supra note 5, at 22 (observing that "[w]elfare rights ... are
intended to guarantee success, at least at a minimum level").
26.
See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 40 (asserting that "positive
rights typically promote equality"); Marks, supra note 5 at 441 (citing Karel Vasak's
use of the second element of the French Revolution's motto, "6galit6," to describe the
aim of second-generation rights).
27.
See Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/2929, at 7, 8 (1955) [hereinafter Annotations] ('Without
economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights might be purely nominal
in character; without civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights
could not be long ensured.").
28.
See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 40 ("Negative rights ban and
exclude government; positive ones invite and demand government. The former require
the hobbling of public officials, while the latter require their affirmative intervention.");
see also Alston & Quinn, supra note 19, at 159 (comparing CPRs, which require states
to abstain from harmful action, with ESCRs, which require "active" state intervention);
KELLEY, supra note 5, at 26 (recognizing that the "implementation of welfare rights
requires a[n] . . . activist form of government" that typically becomes involved in "largescale transfer programs"); Henkin, supra note 20, at 34 (indicating that social and
economic rights "imply a government that is activist [and] intervening"); Iglesias,
supra note 4, at 194 (recognizing that "second generation rights depend upon the
programmatic interventions of the welfare state"); Marks, supra note 5, at 438
(acknowledging that the achievement of many social and economic rights would be
"inconceivable without an active role by the state").
29.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30.
See Shedrack C. Agbakwa, Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights as the Cornerstoneof African Human Rights, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 177, 178 (2002) (noting that "in practice states have paid less attention to the
enforcement and implementation of ESCR[s] ... than other rights."); Padideh Ala'i, A
Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary Observations, 33 GEO. WASH.
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Western states, in particular, have emphasized CPRs 3 1 and neglected
ESCRs 32 at every level of society. While the political and judicial
arms of these states frequently invoke CPRs in professional
discourse, they rarely use ESCRs to support their arguments and
decisions. 3 3 Despite increasing criticism about the selective nature of
their work, 34 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to
35
the promotion of human rights follow the same pattern of neglect.
Scholars with expertise in international human rights have likewise
exhibited a disregard for ESCRs; one source found no more than a

INT'L L. REV. 537, 544 (2001) ("Economic, social and cultural rights . . . are being
increasingly recognized as 'rights,' but have not traditionally enjoyed the same level of
recognition as civil and political rights."); Toebes, supra note 12, at 661 (observing that
"[a]lthough it is often asserted that both sets of rights are interdependent, interrelated,
and of equal importance, in practice, Western states and NGOs, in particular, have
tended to treat economic, social, and cultural rights as if they were less important than
civil and political rights"); see also Shelton, supra note 19, at 121 (explaining that the
U.S. government has "refused to give equal status" to ESCRs).
31.
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 354 (2001) (describing the
doctrine of Western states, in which "civil and political rights appear to be of primary
importance"); SHAW, supra note 12, at 208 (discussing the "view adopted by the
Western world," which tends "to emphasize the basic civil and political rights of
individuals").
32.
See Toebes, supra note 12, at 661; see also Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Beyond
the Rhetoric: Reinvigoratingthe Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1995) (observing that the "arena of human rights discourse and
practice has been dominated by attention to . .. civil and political rights" and that
"economic, social and cultural rights are much less well known, and only
rarely.., form the subject of concerted political action, media campaigns or critical
reportage").
33.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 238 (describing as "one of the
puzzles in the field" the ICESCR's "rare invocation in the play of internal politics [and]
in the judiciaries of most states," especially when compared with the "frequent
invocation" of CPRs established by the UDHR and ICCPR).
34.
See Katherine E. Cox, Should Amnesty InternationalExpand Its Mandate
to Cover Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?, 16 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261, 261
(1999) (criticizing the limited scope of Amnesty's work and suggesting that it take on a
broader role).
35.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 268 (observing that "despite
occasional affirmations of intent to adopt a broader focus," international human rights
NGOs tend "to be pre-occupied with civil and political rights"); Agbakwa, supra note
30, at 201 (noting that "prominent transnational human rights groups have yet to rise
fully to the occasion in the area of ESCR[s]"); Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New
Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 388-90 (1990) (arguing that human rights NGOs are
"not at all well qualified" to lead the campaign for ESCRs because their record shows
"virtually no policy advocacy" in this field); Cox, supra note 34, at 282 (expressing "no
doubt" that human rights NGOs "have neglected economic and social rights" and
suggesting that they bear partial responsibility "for the underdevelopment of these
rights"); Toebes, supra note 12, at 661 (indicating the "Western ... NGOs . . . have

tended to treat economic, social, and cultural rights as if they were less important than
civil and political rights").
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"meager" body of relevant work produced by a "handful" of scholars. 36
Perhaps one may attribute the apparent lack of interest in ESCRs to
lingering doubts about their compatibility with the traditional
37
machinery of adjudication and enforcement.
While most states have merely neglected ESCRs, the United
States has shown outright "hostility. ' 38 Although Presidents Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter, and William J. Clinton expressed
support for ESCRs as a matter of domestic or international law, 39 the
administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush
"categorically denied" the existence of ESCRs. 40 In a notorious
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to agree:

36.
See Alston, supra note 35, at 388; see also Barbara Stark, Urban Dispair
and Nietzsche's "EternalReturn" From the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to
the InternationalLaw of Economic Rights, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 194 (1995)
("Few scholars in the United States . .. really care about the philosophical, moral, or
jurisprudential underpinnings of economic rights. Even those most concerned about
economic justice generally avoid them.").
37.
See Annotations, supra note 27, at 7,
9-11 (recounting debates about
whether ESCRs constitute justiciable, legal rights); David M. Trubek, Economic,
Social, and CulturalRights in the Third World: Human Rights Law and Human Needs
Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 205, 211-12

(referring to doubts that the international community could create "court-like"
structures to supervise ESCRs).
38.
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 249; see also Agbakwa, supra note 30,
at 202-03 (identifying the "hostility of some Western states" to ESCRs and, in
describing the tactics of those states, mentioning the United States in particular); Ala'i,
supra note 30, at 545 (observing that the "United States has been, for the most part,
opposed to the recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights as 'rights"'); Alston,
supra note 35, at 382, 391 (mentioning the "deep-seated reluctance on the part of the
U.S. Government to embrace the concept of economic, social and cultural rights," as
well as the fact that "a significant segment of public opinion would be actively opposed"
to ratification of the ICESCR); Alston & Quinn, supra note 19, at 158 (describing the
efforts of the U.S. government further to strengthen the case against ESCRs); Iglesias,
supra note 4, at 186 (asserting that "the United States recognizes only civil and
political rights and continues to deny economic and social rights any legal status");
Marks, supra note 5, at 440 (recalling the "persistent reluctance in the United States to
take economic, social, and cultural rights seriously"); Stark, supra note 36, at 225-26
(noting that, "[h]istorically, the United States has rejected economic rights").
39.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supranote 5, at 243, 249-50.
40.
Alston, supra note 35, at 367; see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at
250 (stating that the "Reagan and Bush Administrations .. . opposed the concept of
economic and social rights"); Shelton, supra note 19, at 121 (explaining that "the
Reagan Administration's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs called the idea that economic and social rights constitute human
rights a 'myth"); Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and
InternationalHuman Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 79, 91 (1992) (concluding that the "federal government under the Reagan and Bush
administrations has emphasized its hostility toward economic rights"); cf. Arzt, supra
note 5, at 40 (indicating that, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, the United
States "was almost unique among industrialized states in its virtual neglect of social
welfare problems").
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The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation of the State's power
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security ....
[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
41
may not deprive the individual.

Thus, policy statements and judicial decisions establish a reluctance
42
among the U.S. political leadership to embrace ESCRs.
Furthermore, observers also have concluded that the U.S. public
remains 44deeply suspicious of ESCRs, 43 describing them as
"socialist
or "un-American 45 enterprises.

41.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989). See also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2003)
(recognizing the right to health as a "virtuous goal[ ]," but concluding that its "vague,"
"indeterminate," "amorphous," and "boundless" character prevents its application in
adversial proceedings).
42.
See Alston, supra note 35, at 372-78, 382-83 (discussing policy statements,
congressional testimony, and judicial decisions, and concluding that they provide
"considerable evidence" of the U.S. government's "deep-seated reluctance to embrace
the concept of economic, social and cultural rights").
43.
See id. at 366 (observing that the ICESCR "has failed to attract any
significant domestic support" and that "many Americans" still view the treaty "with
suspicion"); see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE
FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 43
(1986) (implying that the current "cultural consensus" does not include the proposition
that "the basic economic conditions of human welfare are ... due to persons by right");
Drew S. Days III, Affirmative Action, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CONFLICT 85, 99 (Larry
Gostin ed., 1988) (concluding that "in the current United States political
environment ... the chances of mobilizing adequate public support for the
establishment of comprehensive social welfare programs are almost nil").
44.
See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong. 111 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony
of Phyllis Schlafly) (predicting that ratification of the ICESCR "would constitute a
giant step toward a socialist state"); ROBERT W. LEE, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONSPIRACY 108 (1981) (describing the ICESCR as a "socialist blueprint that
encourages open-ended unlimited government meddling of the sort on which
dictatorships thrive"); Alston & Quinn, supra note 19, at 160 (recognizing that ESCRs
"are often perceived to be of a deeply ideological nature, to necessitate an unacceptable
degree of intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and to be inherently
incompatible with a free market economy"); cf. CASSESE, supra note 31, at 355
(mentioning the clear preference of socialist states for ESCRs); Stark, supra note 40, at
81 (opining that, "[d]uring the Cold War, the U.S. Department of State viewed [the]
ICESCR as a socialist manifesto").
45.
See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 216 (expressing surprise at the
persistence of claims that 'positive rights' are somehow un-American"); Alston, supra
note 35, at 383 (observing that the ICESCR's ideological opponents "sometimes seem to
portray it as an intrinsically un-American enterprise"); cf. Hearings, supra note 44, at
325 (statement of 0. Garibaldi) (arguing that the ICESCR "is largely a document of
collectivist inspiration, alien in spirit and philosophy to the principles of a free
economy"); Higgins, supra note 14, at 497 (warning that the achievement of ESCRs
"entails a loss of individual liberties which is unacceptable to western liberal
democracies"); Stark, supra note 36, at 194-95 (concluding that "[e]conomic rights are
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One need not search long for the roots of U.S. resistance to
ESCRs. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the
modern U.S. psyche all suggest that the United States has chosen
autonomy 46 and individualism 4 7 as its central values. In U.S. society,
liberty represents the primary need, and governmental interference
represents the principal threat. 48 In contrast, one must work much
harder to find an historical commitment to equality in the United
States. While the Declaration of Independence recognizes that "all
men are created equal," Professor Henkin has observed that the
concept of equality does not appear in the original Constitution or the
Bill of Rights. 49 To the contrary, it appeared only in the
Reconstruction Amendments and then applied only to the states. 50
Much more time passed before women received the franchise. 51 Later
still, the Supreme Court formally abolished racial segregation 52 and,
by sleight of hand, extended the constitutional requirement of equal
53
protection to the federal government.

considered too marginal-too alien to U.S. culture and too remote from U.S. law-to be
taken seriously").
46.
See Henkin, supra note 20, at 30 (observing that the Declaration of
Independence rests on a political theory in which autonomy "is the basic right, the
foundation for all others"), 46 (observing that U.S. constitutional standards serve the
purpose of protecting individuals from harmful government action).
47.
See Alston, supra note 35, at 384 (quoting Sheila B. Kamerman & A.J.
Kahn, Social Policy and Children in the United States and Europe, in THE
VULNERABLE 351, 375 (John L. Palmer et al. eds., 1988), for the proposition that the
U.S. psyche reflects the selection of "individualism as a central value"); Days, supra
note 43, at 86 (recounting the frequent description of the United States as a "classless
society in which rugged individualism and self-reliance are highly rewarded"); see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 48 (1991) (noting that the "American rights dialect"
pays "extraordinary homage to independence and self-sufficiency").
48.
See KELLEY, supra note 5, at 16 (discussing the form of individualism
produced by Enlightenment thinking).
49.
See Henkin, supra note 20, at 41.
50.
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("No State shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Even after the
United States accepted a constitutional commitment to equality, practice lagged far
behind theory. See e.g., Days, supra note 43, at 87 (explaining that "[w]ith relatively
few
exceptions[,]
the
Supreme
Court
construed
the
Civil
War
Amendments ... restrictively, leaving blacks largely unprotected against . . . official
efforts to reduce them once again to positions of subservience").
51.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
sex.").
52.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (abolishing racial
segregation).
53.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Because the Supreme Court
relied on the Due Process Clause-the same clause used to keep Dred Scott enslavedto infer the federal government's obligation to provide equal protection, Professor
Henkin has described its reasoning as "historically and intellectually questionable."
Henkin, supra note 20, at 41.
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Even though the United States has now developed some
commitment to the principle of equality, that commitment remains
conspicuously weak. 54 Although it extends to the principle of legal or
formal equality, which requires procedural equality of opportunity, it
does not extend to the principle of equality in fact, which requires
substantive equality of outcomes.5 5 Thus, the Supreme Court recently
affirmed that state schools have no lawful interest in reducing the
historic deficit of minorities in professional education or in remedying
societal discrimination. 56 In fact, the Court upheld the consideration
of race in admissions practices on the theory that diversity supports
the exercise of liberty rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
5' 7
thought and "educational autonomy.
Under the circumstances just described, one may understand the
United States' traditional aversion to ESCRs. While recognition of
ESCRs would require active state intervention in private affairs to
promote equality in fact, we live in a society that possesses a weak
commitment to principles of equality, that deeply fears governmental
intervention in private affairs, and that values liberty above all else.
Therefore observers have suggested that the establishment of
widespread public support for ESCRs "could not even be
58
contemplated" in the United States.

54.
See Henkin, supra note 20, at 42 (describing the U.S. conception of equality
as "limited"). Stated conversely, our history of "discrimination has dropped roots deep
into our culture that will be difficult to extirpate." Days, supra note 43, at 99.
55.
See id. As the Permanent Court of International Justice held in 1935:
It is perhaps not easy to define the distinction between notions of equality in
fact and equality in law; nevertheless, it may be said that the former notion
excludes the idea of a merely formal equality ....
Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact
may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result
which establishes an equilibrium between different situations.
It is easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment of the majority and
of the minority, whose situation and requirements are different, would result in
inequality in fact ....The equality between members of the majority and of the
minority must be an effective, genuine equality; that is the meaning of
[equality in fact].
Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. AIB) No. 64, at 19
(Apr. 6).
56.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2336-37 (2003) (endorsing these
views as previously articulated by Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 306-07, 310 (1978)).
57.
See id. at 2337-39.
Alston, supranote 35, at 377; see also Days, supra note 43, at 99.
58.
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III. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION RIGHTS

Strictly speaking, NAFTA's investment chapter does not address
the topic of human rights. 59 As Part III(A) of this article explains,
however, its text shares a philosophical affinity with CPRs.
Furthermore, as Part III(B) suggests, debates surrounding its
application establish an astonishing level of support among the
media, civil society, scholars, and the U.S. government for principles
that advance ESCRs at the expense of liberty rights. Thus, below the
surface, Chapter 11 supplies the unexpected setting for a competition,
in which ESCRs seem to be gaining ground.

A. Chapter 11: The PhilosophicalContribution of CPRs
Although most observers trace the provenance of NAFTA's
investment chapter to a network of approximately 2,000 bilateral
investment treaties (BITs),60 one may dig deeper. For example, the

59.
See Access to TransnationalJustice, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 531, 533,
535 (1994) (remarks by Robert F. Housman) (observing that, in the case of human
rights, the "NAFTA package provides ... no access to transnational justice"); see also
Julie Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: Investor Protection, Integration and the Public
Interest, CHOICES: CANADA'S OPTIONS IN N. AM., Mar. 2003, at 2, available at
(recognizing that "the NAFTA and its
http://www.irpp.org/choices/index.htm
institutions were not designed to manage social welfare issues").
60.
See Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under
NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 531, 534, 537 (2002); see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,
58-77 (2001) (separate opinion of
Partial Award (Nov. 12, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408,
Bryan Schwartz, NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com
[hereinafter S.D. Myers, Partial Award]; Michael P. Avramovich, The Protection of
InternationalInvestment at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: Will Anachronistic
Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on
Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1240-41 (1998); Charles H. Brower II,
Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L.
REV. 43, 44 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium]; Charles H.
Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 44 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA's
Investment Chapter]; Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?:
Developing the InternationalRule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
193, 193-94 (2001); David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and
Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
651, 653, 671 (2001) [hereinafter Gantz, Potential Conflicts]; David A. Gantz,
Resolution of Investment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10
ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 339 (1993); Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of
InternationalTrade Disputes-Challengesto Sovereignty-A CanadianPerspective, 24
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 133 (1998); Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora'sBox?: Private
Remedies for Foreign Investors Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 77, 85 (2000); Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's
Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Participation,16 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 4 (1999);
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network of BITs draws on the customary international law of state
responsibility for economic injury to aliens,6 1 which also supplies a
foundation for the modern international law of CPRs.6 2 Bearing in
the characteristics
mind this legal genealogy, one may easily discern
63
of liberty rights in NAFTA's investment chapter.
Designed by U.S. negotiators to protect U.S. investors from
l's
arbitrary treatment by Mexican authorities, 64 Chapter

Gus van Harten, Guatemala's Peace Accords in a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 3
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEVEL. L.J. 113, 137 (2000); David R. Adair, Comment, Investors'
Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
195, 204 (1999); Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD
MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 195
(1996); Julia Ferguson, California'sMTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the
Need for an Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL L. & POLY 499, 502 (2000); Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State
Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 132-33 (1999); Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA's Provision for
Compensation in the Event of Expropriation:A Reassessment of the "Prompt,Adequate
and Effective" Standard,31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 445, 447 (1995).
61.
See SHAW, supra note 12, at 582 (concluding that a British investment
treaty reaffirms "traditional principles dealing with the conditions of lawful
expropriation and the provision for compensation").
See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 104
62.
(1999) (describing the law of state responsibility as "a precursor to international
human rights law"); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 5, at 82 (referring to the law of
state responsibility as "a branch of international law that was among the important
predecessors to contemporary human rights law").
Cf. Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns, The Brave New World of
63.
Global Arbitration, 3 J. WORLD. INV. 173, 177 (2002):
Human rights law and modern trade law share a common concern with the
protection of nationals of one State within the jurisdiction of
another ....
[T]here has been an increasing trend in favour of . . . the
recognition of private rights of action by individuals against States, . . . [and]
the right to arbitration of a foreign investor against a host State under a
multilateral ... investment treaty has its human rights counterpart in private
petitions under the European Convention on Human Rights and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.
See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 2, at 12; Brower, A Tale of Fear and
64.
Equilibrium, supra note 60, at 43; Gantz, Potential Conflicts, supra note 60, at 653;
Tim Kennish, NAFTA and Investment-A Canadian Perspective, in NAFTA AND
INVESTMENT 1, 7 (Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C. Alexander eds., 1995); Ian A. Laird,
NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 224 (2001); Richard C.
Levin & Susan Erickson Marin, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and Investment
Disputes, 2 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 82, 83 (1996); Howard Mann, NAFTA and the
Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402 (2000); Julie A.
Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives
Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 88 (1999); Soloway, supra note 60, at 4;
Tollefson, supra note 3, at 148; Ganguly, supra note 60, at 154; Lauren E. Godshall,
Student Article, In the Cold Shadow of Metalclad" The Potential for Change to
NAFTA's ChapterEleven, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 264, 268 (2002); Ray C. Jones, Note &
Comment, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 527, 541 (2002); Levy, supra
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substantive provisions create a wide zone of autonomy into which
host states may not intrude. Thus, Chapter 11 forbids the NAFTA
Parties to treat each others' investors unfairly and inequitably;6 5 to
impose certain performance requirements (such as requirements to
export a certain percentage of goods or services, or to achieve a given
level of domestic content); 66 to establish nationality requirements for
senior management positions;6 7 to restrict financial transfers; 68 or to
expropriate investment property (except on a non-discriminatory

basis, in accordance with due process of law, and upon prompt
payment of fair market value plus interest).6 9 Noting the similarities
between these provisions and the liberty rights guaranteed by the

principal human rights instruments, 70 several observers have
described Chapter 11 as a "human rights treaty"71 or a "bill of
rights" 72 for foreign investors. 73 In other words, Chapter 11 displays a

note 60, at 444; Daniel R. Loritz, Comment, CorporatePredatorsAttack Environmental
Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 533, 535 (2000); Starner, supra note 3, at 412, 419; Stephen
L. Kass, Regulatory Takings Debate Reopened: Surprising, Potentially Significant,
Context Is NAFTA Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 2000 at § 2, col. 1.
65.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1).
See id. art. 1106.
66.
67.
See id. art. 1107(1).
68.
See id. art. 1109.
69.
See id. art. 1110.
See Alvarez, Critical Theory, supra note 4, at 307-08; Iglesias, supra note 4,
70.
at 196.
71.
Alvarez, CriticalTheory, supra note 4, at 307-08; see also Alvarez Remarks,
supra note 4, at 9 (explaining that Chapter 11 "treats foreign investors essentially like
bearers of human rights in regional human rights systems").
72.
Been & Beauvais, supra note 2, at 40; Tollefson, supra note 3, at 148;
Taylor, supra note 4, at 412; see also Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moreman, Costs
and Benefits of Private Participationin WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It
Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 225 (2003) (recognizing that "Chapter 11 protects
private property from certain kinds of state actions, and thus is arguably consistent
with natural rights"); Starner, supra note 3, at 417 (observing that "NAFTA exhibits
characteristics typical of a constitution," including a "pre-commitment strategy" that
attempts "to disable domestic political institutions from pursuing certain legislative
goals").
73.
Some writers apparently would disagree with these characterizations,
either because they believe that human rights treaties and investment treaties serve
different underlying policies, or because they believe that Chapter 11 creates no
individual rights, but merely gives investors standing to assert treaty rights granted to
their home states. See Legum, supra note 60, at 537 (asserting that "the policies
underlying human rights and their protection differ significantly from those underlying
investment protections"); J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 433, 460 (2002) (describing investor-state arbitration as "an
extraordinary elevation of a private party's standing to assert international legal rights
owed to the state of which it is a part") (emphasis added). Because Chapter 11 grants to
investors rights in addition to those granted to their home states, the latter proposition
seems dubious. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115 (granting investors the right to
bring claims "without prejudice" to the coordinate rights of states parties under
Chapter 20); see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), J 76-
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hallmark of traditional U.S.5 doctrine: 74 the emphasis on liberty from
7
governmental intervention.
Although some observers suggest that Chapter 11 "ignores"7 6s or
"excludes"'7 7 ESCRs, those claims seem unduly categorical. For
example, instead of promoting liberty, certain provisions (such as the
articles relating to national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment) promote equality, 78 a principle more consistent with
ESCRs than with traditional U.S. understandings of CPRs. 79 Also,
the prohibition of performance requirements remains subject to an
exception sounding in the right to health (e.g., measures "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health," as well as "for the
80
conservation of living or nonliving exhaustible natural resources").
Furthermore, although they may be of limited utility, Articles 1101(4)
and 1114(1) authorize the NAFTA Parties to maintain and enforce
measures that support ESCRs, such as the right to health, social
security, education, and environmental protection, 8 ' provided that

77, available at www.icj-cij.org (rejecting the United States' argument that Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations grants rights only to states parties and
concluding that the treaty also provides rights directly to individuals arrested or
detained by states parties).
See Alvarez, Critical Theory, supra note 4, at 312 (suggesting that "much of
74.
the NAFTA investment chapter reflects U.S. laws and perspectives").
75.
See Tollefson, supra note 3, at 183 (concluding that "the paramount and
overriding goal of Chapter 11 is to create a powerful . . . vehicle to ensure that
governments eschew measures that might be construed as restricting foreign
investment").
76.
See Alvarez, Critical Theory, supra note 4, at 308 (observing that Chapter
11 "ignores" many of the social and economic rights contained in the UDHR, including
the rights to work and to an adequate standard of living).
See Iglesias, supra note 4, at 197 (complaining that Chapter 11 "only
77.
protects the human rights of ... foreign investor[s]," but "blatantly exclude[s] ... the
social, economic, and cultural rights of the most vulnerable Latinas/os").
78.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1102, 1103. Also known as the "minimum
standard," the obligation under Article 1105(1) to provide "fair and equitable
treatment" essentially constitutes a prohibition against arbitrary treatment. Gantz,
Potential Conflicts, supra note 60, at 678, 746. Although arbitrary governmental
intervention may often violate the principle of individual liberty, the concept of
arbitrary treatment also includes invidious discrimination. See id. at 747; see also
Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 311 (1994)
(construing "fair and equitable treatment" to prohibit discrimination against aliens).
Therefore, unlike most provisions of Chapter 11, Article 1105 protects both liberty and
equality.
79.
See supra notes 26, 46-56 and accompanying text.
80.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106(6); see also Tollefson, supra note 3, at 157
(explaining that, unique among the substantive provisions of Chapter 11, "Article 1106
specifically exempts environmental measures" from the disciplines on performance
requirements).
81.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101(4) (permitting the NAFTA Parties to
provide income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public
education, and health care); id. at art. 1114(1) (authorizing the NAFTA parties to adopt
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they remain "otherwise consistent" with the obligations imposed by
Chapter 11.82 Despite these important qualifications, however,
Chapter l's text palpably emphasizes liberty rights as opposed to
83
ESCRs.
Consistent with the textual emphasis on liberty and autonomy,
investors have used Chapter 11 to challenge a variety of measures
ostensibly designed to protect ESCRs. Arguably implicating the right
to health,8 4 investors have challenged restrictions imposed on the
operation of a hazardous waste facility,8 5 restrictions on cross-border

and maintain measures considered "appropriate to ensure that investment activity ...
is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns").
82.
Id.; see also Been & Beauvais, supra note 2, at 44 (recognizing that parts of
Article 1114(1) sound promising for environmental concerns, but explaining that
Article 1114(1) does not, in fact, provide any exceptions to the investment disciplines
because Article 1114(1) requires that environmental measures be "otherwise consistent
with" Chapter 11). After parsing its language, many scholars conclude that Article
1114(1) lacks any substantive meaning. See INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. &
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS 12 (2001) (indicating that
Article 1114(1) "is not particularly meaningful") [hereinafter PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS]; Paterson, supra note 60, at 105 (suggesting that Article 1114 is "largely
meaningless"); Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers,
Inc. v. Canada: It Is Possible to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with
Investment Protection, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 181-82 (2001)
(describing Article 1114(1) as a "hortatory environmental provision" that cannot
"override mandatory treaty obligations"); Jones, supra note 64, at 555 (asserting that
the language of Article 1114(1) is "largely meaningless"). Others conclude, more
charitably, that the provision has meaning, but does not lend itself well to
interpretation. See Brower, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA's Investment Chapter,
supra note 60, at 41; David A. Gantz, Some Comments on NAFTA's Chapter 11, 42 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1285, 1297 (2001); Tollefson, supra note 3, at 151-52. At the very least,
Article 1114(1) recognizes that some environmental regulations do not violate Chapter
11. Perhaps the provision even establishes a presumption that bona fide environmental
regulations do not violate Chapter 11.
83.
See infra note 93. This emphasis on liberty reflects traditional Western
development theory, which assumes that economic liberalization will increase
"economic growth," which in turn will bring "increased access to health care, food, and
shelter." Robert McCorquodale & Richard Fairbrother, Globalization and Human
Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 735, 743 (1999); see also Trubek, supra note 37, at 226
(explaining how 'Western development theory dealt with issues of social welfare in the
Third World").
84.
Mindful of robust debates about the public-health implications of the
substances and activities involved, the author emphasizes his use of the word
"arguably" and does not, in this article, express any views about the scientific basis for
public concerns.
85.
See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Notice of Arbitration (Jan. 2, 1997),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com. According to some authors, previous owners
of the facility dumped 20,000 metric tons of hazardous waste at the facility, which
caused serious health problems for local residents as well as a risk of explosion. See
J.C. Thomas, The Experience of NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals to Date: A Practitioner's
Perspective 7 (Jan. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http:/www.
carleton.calctpllchapterl1) (identifying a risk of explosion and equating the level of
contamination with that found at Love Canal, New York, "the site that triggered the
enactment of the U.S. Superfund legislation"); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, The North
American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corp
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trade in polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),8 6 restrictions on fuel
additives thought to create health risks,87 restrictions on chemicals
used to treat seeds,88 and restrictions on bulk exports of fresh
water.8 9 Likewise, arguably implicating the right to work or to social
security, investors have challenged employment-boosting "Buy
America" procurement rules, 90 as well as the operations of Canada
Post, 91 thereby creating a theoretical risk of layoffs for Canadian
postal workers or unfavorable changes in the management of their

v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 240 (2001) (describing
allegations that the site "presented a serious risk of explosion" and caused "health
problems . . . including the birth of malformed and brain-damaged children, chronic
breathing disorders, and multiple abortions"); Godshall, supra note 64, at 279
(discussing allegations about health problems and the possibility of explosion).
37 (Oct. 30, 1998),
86.
See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Statement of Claim,
availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
87.
See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration, T 14-19 (Dec.
3, 1999), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (challenging California's ban on
MTBE, a fuel additive whose release from underground storage tanks into the
environment arguably posed a significant threat of groundwater and drinking water
contamination); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, at 4 (Apr. 14, 1997),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Notice of Arbitration (Ethyl
Corp.)] (challenging a ban on the importation of and inter-provincial trade in MMT, a
fuel additive the combustion of which purportedly threatened human health); see also
Ganguly, supra note 60, at 150-51, 155 (citing studies which showed that MTBE caused
tumors in lab rats and evidence linking the main ingredient of MMT to neurological
problems); Lilley, supra note 2, at 731, 738 (mentioning that some studies link MTBE
to the development of renal tumors in male (but not female) lab rats, observing that
MTBE has "an unpleasant taste and odor" that make contaminated water "unsuitable
for drinking," and noting the claims of environmentalists that MMT is hazardous to
human health).
88.
See Crompton Corp. v. Canada, Amended Notice of Intent to Submit a
Complaint to Arbitration, at 3-5 (Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com
(challenging restrictions on lindane-based seed treatments imposed by the Canadian Pest
Management Regulatory Agency).
See Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Claim and Demand for
89.
Arbitration, at 2-3 (Oct. 12, 1999, NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.
naftaclaims.com (challenging British Columbia's restrictions on bulk exports of fresh
water). As noted above, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
interpreted the right to health to include an obligation for states to provide their people
with access to adequate supplies of safe and potable water. See supra note 23. See also
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Water,
Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., gen. cmt. 15, 77 2, 12, 23,
44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), available at wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/
gencommlescgencoml5.htm (concluding that the rights to an adequate standard of
living and to the highest attainable standard of health include the right of access to
safe water in adequate amounts, as well as the state's obligation to prevent inequitable
extraction of water resources); Ganguly, supra note 60, at 148 (observing that the
"moratorium on bulk-water exports by British Columbia represented a move to protect
a natural resource that is of the utmost importance to human health").
90.
ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration, at 8, 13-14 (July
19, 2000, NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
91.
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, at 2-4
(Apr. 19, 2000, NAFTA/UNCITRAL), availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.
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pension funds. 92 Thus, on their face, many Chapter 11 claims reflect
93
the traditional U.S. preference for CPRs over ESCRs.

B. DebatesAbout the Application of Chapter 11: The Contributionof
ESCRs
The first publicized use of Chapter 11 seemed to confirm the
textual preference for liberty rights. Citing concerns about human
health, Canada banned importation of and inter-provincial trade in
MMT, a fuel additive made solely by Virginia-based Ethyl
Corporation. 94 Rejecting the health concerns as unfounded, 95 Ethyl
Corp. described the Canadian measure as a thinly-disguised trade
barrier 96 and commenced a Chapter 11 arbitration seeking over $250
million 9 7 for expropriation, imposition of performance requirements,
and denial of national treatment. 98 Rather than defend itself on the
merits, Canada settled the claim by withdrawing the restrictions on
MMT 9 9 and by paying Ethyl Corp. $19.3 million (Canadian) in
compensation.100 Despite the apparent vindication of liberty rights,
this chain of events sparked widespread outrage by creating the
perception that foreign investors could use those rights to frustrate
protection of the right to health. 1 1
92.
See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Canada, Petition to Arbitation Tribunal,
9 25-27 (May 10, 2001, NAFTAJUNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com;
id., Petition to Arbitration Tribunal, I 27-29 (Nov. 8, 2000, NAFTAJUNCITRAL),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
93.
See Stephen Clarkson, Systemic or Surgical? Possible Cures for NAFTA's
Investor-State Dispute Process, 36 CAN. Bus. L.J. 368, 384 (2002) (recognizing that
"Chapter 11's new corporate rights" were not "balanced by a requirement to promote
the public interest by protecting the environment or public health"); Beauvais, supra
note 2, at 266 (observing that "NAFTA does not require these broadly-defined investor
protections be balanced against competing social concerns, such as human rights,
environmental protection, or public health").
94.
See Notice of Arbitration (Ethyl Corp.), supra note 86, TT 8-11; see also
Soloway, supra note 64, at 56 (identifying Canada's reasons for imposing restrictions
on MMT).
95.
See Notice of Arbitration (Ethyl Corp.), supra note 86, TT 7, 11, 50-52.
96.
See id. 13.
97.
See id. 19; Soloway, supra note 64, at 84.
98.
See Notice of Arbitration (Ethyl Corp.), supra note 86, 9 14-69; Soloway,
supra note 64, at 85-86.
See International Law in Ferment: Recent Developments in Private
99.
InternationalLaw, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 11, 14 (2000) (remarks by Charles H.
Brower II); Soloway, supra note 64, at 55, 84.
100.
See Soloway, supra note 64, at 55, 56, 84.
101.
See Frank E. Loy, On a Collision Course? Two Potential Environmental
Conflicts Between the U.S. and Canada, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 11, 19, 21 (2002) (asserting
that the case "set off shock waves" and "raised a storm within the environmental
community"); Lilley, supra note 2, at 730 (explaining that "[wihen the Canadian
government settled the Ethyl claim by rescinding the offending regulation and
agreeing to pay some $19.3 million (Canadian) to the claimant, the action outraged
environmental protection proponents"); Kass, supra note 64 (reporting that the
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The past few years have witnessed an escalation of public
concern that the liberty rights of foreign investors under Chapter 11
endanger the right to health. Although environmental NGOs issue
many of the relevant warnings, 0 2 expressions of concern emanate
from a wide variety of sources and appear in virtually every
medium. 10 3 For example, in a PBS broadcast, respected television
journalist Bill Moyers opined that "foreign companies are exploiting
Chapter 11 to attack public laws that protect our health .... Here in
California ... [a] billion-dollar case has been filed against the United
States because of an effort by the state government to protect the
health of its citizens. ' 10 4 Referring to the same case, an article in the
New York Times reported that
[C]orporate victories have spawned .. .bolder and broader challenges,
each one further undermining public policy. In a recent case that critics
consider one of the most worrisome, the Methanex Corporation of
Vancouver, British Columbia, is challenging California's decision to
phase out the use of a gasoline additive . . . [that] [t]he state
105
considers ... to be a health hazard when it enters the water supply.
10 6
Similar reports have appeared in the Canadian press.
Surveying the work of civil society, one finds widespread concern
that investors will use their liberty rights to undermine the right to
health. 10 7 In addition to publishing individual reports that contain

Canadian government's decision to suspend the restrictions on MMT and to
compensate Ethyl Corp. "sparked outrage from ... U.S. and Canadian NGOs, which
accused the government of capitulating to bullying tactics aimed at chilling Canada's
ability to protect its public health and environment"); see also Godshall, supra note 64,
at 286-87 (suggesting that the claim and its settlement created "a chill that could
arguably further grow into a minor ice age over much social, environmental and
health-related regulation").
102.
See Jones, supra note 64, at 553 (identifying "environmental advocacy
groups" as "Chapter l's most vociferous opponents").
103.
See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2003)
(observing "open criticism of investment arbitration has been voiced by significant
elements of the media").
104.
Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast Feb. 5,
2002), transcriptavailable at http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcripttdfull-print.html.
105.
Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals
Settle Disputes, But Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1.
106.
See, e.g., David Runnalls & Howard Mann, Still Time to Fix Flawed Trade
Rule: NAFTA's Chapter 11 Clear Sign of Excesses of TradeAgreements, WINNIPEG FREE
PRESS, Apr. 30, 2001, at All, available at 2001 WL 16236366 (describing a "recent
string of corporate victories" that "strik[e] down environmental and human health
protection measures" and concluding that the challenge of environmental and publichealth measures has become "Chapter ll's most common use").
107.
See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 63, at 195 ('The broad-but-vague right
of foreign investors to compensation for expropriations has and will continue to bring
investor-State arbitrations into conflict with groups that use domestic regulation to
advance their own political agendas, such as environmental and public health
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dire warnings, 0 8 prominent advocacy groups (including Earthjustice,
the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Sierra Club, and the World Wildlife Fund) have formed a
coalition which seeks to ensure that trade and investment treaties
will "not weaken . . . international health or environmental
standards."'1 9 Also, the Joint Public Advisory Commission (JPAC),
created under the auspices of NAFTA's environmental side
agreement, 110 has admonished the NAFTA parties to sponsor
research into the "potential existence of a 'chilling effect' on national
laws . .. related to human health" and to improve Chapter 11 by
bringing "environmental, social and cultural expertise .. .into the
arbitration panels.""' Likewise, after calling for a greater emphasis
on "cultural, economic and social rights" in the process of
"[c]ontinental integration,"1 12 the Canadian Conference of Catholic
Bishops warned that Chapter 1l's "primary focus" has been to "limit
government's capacity to support . . .health and other public values
1 13
in the face of commercial interests.'

groups."); Tollefson, supra note 3, at 158 ("Civil society critics fear that Article 1110
will deter governments from enacting regulations to protect public health and the
environment."); see also Gantz, Potential Conflicts, supra note 60, at 653-54 (discussing
the criticism that Chapter 11 permits corporations to attack measures that protect
human health).
108.
See PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS, supra note 82, at 2 (International
Institute for Sustainable Development) ("Chapter 11 does indeed threaten
governments' ability to protect the public interest in terms of ... human health and
other social issues."); J. Martin Wagner, InternationalInvestment, Expropriationand
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 466 (1999) (Director of
International Legal Programs, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund) ("In an
unprecedented move, companies have begun to use this protection to challenge
measures promoted by governments as necessary to protect the environment and
human health."); Mann & von Moltke, Manuscript, supra note 2, at 8 (International
Institute for Sustainable Development) ("The result is a growing sense that the
provisions of Chapter 11 put at risk the ability of governments to .. .anticipate and
forestall environmental and human health damages."); see also Ferguson, supra note
60, at 519 (quoting the Executive Director of The Council of Canadians) ("Surely, even
the U.S. government will now see that NAFTA gives outrageous powers to
corporations, and jeopardizes human health."); Jones, supra note 64, at 556
("[E]nvironmental advocacy groups claim.., that Chapter 11 tips the balance too much
in favor of investors and exposes countries and their citizenry to potentially serious
health and safety impacts.").
109.
Tollefson, supra note 3, at 185 n.242 and accompanying text.
110.
For useful discussions of JPAC and the side agreement, see id. at 165-68;
Francisco N. Nogales, The NAFTA Environmental Framework, Chapter 11 Investment
Provisions, and the Environment, 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 104-08 (2002).
111.
Joint Public Advisory Committee of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Advice to Council No. 03-01 (Mar. 27, 2003),
1-2, available at
http://www.cec.org./files/PDF?IPAC?sr-03-01-EN.pdf.
112.
Permanent Council of the Canadian Conference on Catholic Bishops,
Statement on the Occasion of the Summit of the Americas (Apr. 5, 2001),
17,
available at http://www.cccb.ca/PublicStatements.
113.
Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, Trading Away the Future:
Concerns Arising from the Investor-State Mechanism of the North American Free
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Turning to academic literature, one might expect that the
presence of greater expertise and the absence of an institutional
mission might yield more moderate assessments of the situation. Yet,
11 4
the literature seems awash in warnings that Chapter 11 threatens,
or has the potential to threaten, 115 the right to health. While some
writers offer more optimistic views, 116 one encounters them less

Trade Agreement and Its Extension throughout the Americas, at 2 (background paper
prepared for the Conference on Humanizing the Global Economy, Jan. 28-30, 2002),
available at http://www.cccb.ca/Files/TradingFuture.html;
see also Canadian
Conference on Catholic Bishops, Media Release (Feb. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.cccb.calMediaReleases (stating that "the application of... Chapter 11 has
meant limiting the capacity of governments to safeguard environmental, health and
other social values when there are conflicting commercial interests").
114.
See Clarkson, supra note 93, at 378 (stating that Chapter 11
"gives ...NAFTA corporations the power to overturn the legislative outcomes of
national political debates on the desirable regulatory regime to secure the health and
safety of the citizenry"); Loy, supra note 101, at 18 (recognizing that Chapter 11 cases
"raise starkly the question of whether NAFTA's efforts to protect investors has
unacceptably compromised our nations' right . . . to protect the . . . health of their

citizens"); Tollefson, supra note 3, at 156-57 (explaining that Chapter l's provision on
performance requirements "has been criticized as constraining the ability of
governments to sustainably manage natural resources and to protect public health and
the environment"); William T. Waren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v.
United States and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10986, 10987 (2001)
(contending that "[r]ecent decisions by NAFTA tribunals ...

show that ...

challenges

to core governmental functions can succeed, particularly in the area of public
health ...regulation"); Ganguly, supra note 60, at 114, 153 (arguing that Chapter 11
claims "reveal[ ] an attack on the capability of sovereign governments to protect their
citizenry" from investors who want to "force governments to compensate them for
regulations which . . . protect public health . . . and . . . limit human exposure to

carcinogens or neurotoxins"); Godshall, supra note 64, at 265 (claiming that the "use of
Chapter 11 has cast an ominous shadow over any NAFTA partner's attempt to enact
environmental, health, or safety regulations for the benefit of its own citizenry"); Jenny
Harbine, Note, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration:Deciding the Price of Free Trade, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 371, 373 (2002) (asserting that Chapter 11 "undermines efforts by local
governments to protect human health and the environment"); see also Dhooge, supra
note 85, at 213, 278-79 (discussing the fear that Chapter 11 claims "would deny the
public its previously uninhibited right to clean water and air"); Chris Tollefson,
Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA's Chapter
Eleven Investor-State Claim Process, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 183, 184-85 (2002)
(discussing predictions about the impact of Chapter 11 claims on public health); Jones,
supra note 64, at 545 (predicting that Chapter 11 "may have a chilling effect on the
ability of governments to address pressing social or environmental issues"); Nogales,
supra note 110, at 131 (identifying the increasing concern that "Chapter 11 can
undermine efforts to enact new laws ...

to protect ...

human health"); Starner, supra

note 3, at 421 (concluding that "NAFTA has usurped the regulatory authority of its
member states").
115.
See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 247 ("While the majority of Article 1110
claims to date concern environmental measures, their underlying rationale is equally
applicable to other spheres of government regulation, including labor and public
health.").
116.
See Brower, A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 60, at 85
(concluding that "Chapter 11 tribunals show every sign of maintaining an appropriate
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frequently, as their confidence in the Chapter 11 process has become
more qualified, 117 and they clearly recognize the existence of
widespread concern about Chapter 11.118 Thus, on balance, a review
of academic debates may reinforce the perception that Chapter l's
liberty rights place "[alt stake ... states' ability to regulate effectively

for the preservation of public health."" 19
In the wake of the Ethyl Corp. arbitration, the panorama of
views articulated by the media, civil society, and academics shows an
astonishing level of suspicion for Chapter l's liberty rights and a
correspondingly unexpected level of support at least for one ESCR,
namely the right to health. Yet more surprising have been the
reactions of the U.S. government. For example, in responding to a
claim with at least superficial similarities to Ethyl Corp., the United

balance between the rights of NAFTA investors to air their complaints and the
obligations of NAFTA Parties to regulate in the public interest"); Brower & Steven,
supra note 60, at 200-01 (praising the "high" quality of decisions rendered by Chapter
11 tribunals, seeing "every indication that the tribunals are properly balancing the
legitimate interests of both investors and the NAFTA Parties," and finding "little
substance to the argument that NAFTA empowers corporate interests at the expense of
legitimate regulation"); Laird, supra note 64, at 227-29 (arguing that investors could
not bring viable claims for the regulation of truly dangerous products and concluding
that the "sky" is not "falling" on democracy or sovereignty); Daniel M. Price, Some
Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 421,
423, 424 (2000) (describing concerns about Chapter 11 as "unfounded" and finding "no
reason to expect . . . that . . . tribunals will be receptive to attempts to turn the
[minimum] standard into a weapon to attack bona fide regulatory behavior"); Julie
Soloway & Jeremy Broadhurst, What's in the Medicine Chest for Chapter 1I's Ills?, 36
CAN. BUS. L.J. 388, 403-04 (2002) (finding no "clearly established need for change" to
Chapter 11 and discouraging precipitous actions based on a case of "early jitters").
117.
See Brower, Structure, Legitimacy, and NA-TA's Investment Chapter,
supra note 60, at 58-87 (identifying Chapter l's structural flaws and acknowledging
"growing pessimism" about its future); Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in
the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L (forthcoming Oct. 2003) (explaining how
Chapter 11 injects a "dimension of dysfunctionality in[to] the international
adjudication system," thereby contributing to the latter's failure "to meet the essential
criteria for legitimacy"); Soloway, supra note 59, at 2, 4 (recognizing that "the NAFTA
and its institutions were not designed to manage social welfare issues" and
acknowledging that Chapter l's jurisprudence has revealed "a number of
shortcomings .... calling into question the ongoing viability of its rules").
118.
See Brower, A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 60, at 51
(recognizing that Chapter 11 "has provoked an outcry against the perceived chilling
effect on regulatory programs and the corresponding diminution of sovereignty");
Brower & Steven, supra note 60, at 193 (referring to "all the calumny heaped upon
Chapter 11 . . . by opponents of globalization . . . think tanks, academics, and the
NAFTA Parties themselves"); Laird, supra note 64, at 229 (warning that "hysteria"
threatens to stifle "rational debate about free trade and investment"); Price, supra note
116, at 421 (explaining that Chapter 11 "has been the source of much controversy,"
with "aggressive critics" producing "greatly exaggerated" fears); Soloway & Broadhurst,
supra note 116, at 388 (citing "widespread allegations from both inside and outside the
trade law community that NAFTA is sick and in desperate need of very powerful
medication").
119. Beauvais, supra note 2, at 296.
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States took a position approaching endorsement of the right to health
at the expense of liberty rights:
There is no merit to Methanex's claim that the NAFTA was violated by
the California legislature's authorization of funding for a university
study of the public health and environmental effects of methyl tertiary
butyl ether ("MTBE") and the California Governor's subsequent
executive order calling for certain state agencies to take preliminary
steps toward a phase-out of the use of MTBE in California gasoline.
Methanex's claim does not remotely resemble the type of grievance for
which the States Parties to the NAFTA created the investor-State
dispute resolution mechanism of Chapter 11. Methanex's case is
founded on the proposition that, whenever a state takes action to
protect the public health .. . .the state is responsible for damages to
every business enterprise claiming a resultant setback in its
fortunes.... Plainly put, this proposition is absurd....
The Tribunal should reject Methanex's novel claim to obtain
compensation for public-health measures. Methanex may be
disappointed that California decided to protect its drinking water
supply . . . [b]ut the "NAFTA was not intended to provide foreign
'120
investors with blanket protection from this kind of disappointment."

Likewise, concern about Chapter 11 "figured prominently in debates
over the Trade Promotion Authority Act that President Bush recently
pushed through Congress. ' 12 1 As a result, Congress has instructed

1-3 (Aug. 10,
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Statement of Defense,
120.
2000, NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (quoting award in
Azinian v. Mexico (Nov. 1, 1999), 14 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 538, 562 (1999)); see
also Dhooge, supra note 85, at 282 (observing that "[t]he United States also appears
willing to consider the removal of public health, safety and welfare measures from the
scope of Article 1110," which regulates the expropriation of investments); Price, supra
note 116, at 422-23 (recognizing that "certain agencies in the U.S. government have
become nervous that international investment rules will curtail their ability to adopt
bona fide environmental, health, safety and other regulations").
Canada and Mexico also have advanced public-health and safety justifications for
measures alleged to violate the liberty rights created by Chapter 11. See Ethyl Corp. v.
50, 58, 60, 67(g), 70, 72, 79, 92, 93, 95, 97 (Nov. 27,
Canada, Statement of Defense,
1997, NAFTAJUNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (emphasizing the
public-health justifications for its ban on MMT); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Statement
7, 29-40, 52, 55 (June 18, 1999, NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at
of Defense,
http://www.naftaclaims.com (emphasizing the public-health justifications for Canada's
ban on the export of PCBs); Thomas, supra note 85, at 7 (describing some of the publichealth concerns that Mexico articulated to the Metalclad tribunal as justification for its
restrictions on the operation of a hazardous waste facility). Their positions seem less
remarkable than that of the United States because the Canadian and Mexican legal
systems contemplate more vigorous governmental intervention to safeguard the public
interest and a correspondingly smaller measure of individual liberty with respect to the
use of property. See Wagner, supra note 108, at 510 (examining the Canadian legal
system), 515 (examining the Mexican legal system); Lilley, supra note 2, at 749
(examining the Mexican legal system), 750 (examining the Canadian legal system).
Been & Beauvais, supra note 2, at 35-36. See also Alvarez & Park, supra
121.
note 103, at 385 ("Members of Congress ... complain that NAFTA tribunals override
health and labor laws.").
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the President to "take into account . . . the protection of legitimate
health or safety . . . interests" when negotiating future trade

agreements.1 22 Subsequently, in negotiating agreements with Chile
and Singapore, the United States has advanced the right to health by
exempting completely the issuance of WTO-compliant compulsory
licenses for pharmaceuticals from the article on expropriation and by
emphasizing that, "except in rare circumstances," non-discriminatory
measures designed to protect "public health, safety, and the
environment[ ] do not constitute indirect expropriations."' 23 Seeking,
perhaps, to explain his employer's growing support for the right to
health at the expense of foreign investors' liberty rights, the U.S.
official with primary responsibility for defending Chapter 11 claims
observed that
The last great era of international jurisprudence concerning States'
treatment of foreign investors and investments in their territory was in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-before the rise of
the modern regulatory state. Beginning in the 1930s, the United States
and many other countries shifted toward a model of government that
increasingly regulated daily economic life. The increased regulation of
the modern state clashes with traditional views of property rights along
124
a constantly changing battle line.

In other words, despite the strong textual preference for liberty
rights, Chapter l's application has forced the people and the
government of the United States to reweigh that preference and to
reconsider their suspicion of ESCRs. At the very least, this reflects an
historic erosion of U.S. hostility toward ESCRs 125 and a tacit move
toward acceptance of the U.N.'s description of CPRs and ESCRs as
' 126
"universal" and "indivisible.'

IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Describing the changing attitudes toward CPRs and ESCRs
revealed by the application of Chapter 11 is a relatively simple task.

122.
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(c)(6), 116 Stat. 933, 1002
(2002); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-624, at 157 (2002) (listing as priorities the
establishment of mechanisms "to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to
develop and implement standards for environment and human health based on sound
science," and the protection of "legitimate health or safety . . . interests" when
negotiating trade agreements).
123.
See Draft Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 3, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.9(5),
Annex 10-D, 4(b), available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text/10text.pdf; Free
Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Singapore, arts. 15.6(5), 15.26(b), Exchange of
Letters on Expropriation (May 6, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/
Singapore/final.htm.
124.
Legum, supra note 60, at 539.
125.
See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Appreciating the general significance of this phenomenon, likewise,
requires no great powers of imagination. Evaluating the practical
implications for the presentation of Chapter 11 claims and for the
incorporation of ESCRs into the mainstream of international law is a
more difficult and speculative undertaking. Nevertheless, in an effort
to provoke discussion, Parts IV(A) and IV(B) present some initial
thoughts on these important topics.
A. Implications for Chapter 11 Disputes
Given the widespread opposition to the assertion of liberty rights
in ways perceived to threaten ESCRs, one may first predict that
Chapter 11 tribunals will address these anxieties and will do so in a
way that provides the beneficiaries of ESCRs a measure of standing
to express their concerns. The limited experience to date tends to
confirm this thesis. Although tribunals have not given the NAFTA
parties carte blanche to adopt public health measures, 127 they have
recognized both the existence of public concern 128 and the wide
latitude that international law affords to states to adopt public
regulatory laws. 129 Likewise, in cases arguably involving the rights to
health, work, and social security, tribunals have explicitly recognized
the powerful interests at stake and have shown a willingness to
receive amicus curiae submissions from groups seeking to defend

127.
See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 60,
281 (rejecting Canada's
categorical assertion that non-discriminatory regulatory measures never constitute an
expropriation); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 1 99 (June 26, 2000,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award] (likewise rejecting Canada's categorical assertion); see also
Feldman v. Mex., Award, 110 (Dec. 16, 2002, NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available
at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Feldman, Award], (asserting that "[n]o one
may seriously question that in some instances government regulatory activity can be .a
violation" of Chapter 1l's provisions on expropriation); Beauvais, supra note 2, at 283
(observing that "tribunals uniformly reject an absolute exemption for 'regulatory' or
'police powers' activities from the category of expropriation").
128.
See S.D. Myers, Partial Award (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz), supra
note 60, 11 12, 86, 203 (acknowledging fears that multilateral investment agreements
will impair the capacity of states to "protect citizens or promote social justice,"
referring to academic observers who fear that Chapter 11 claims challenge "the
practical ability of governmental authorities to protect health and the environment,"
and mentioning fears that governments may "shy away from bold regulatory action in
the interests of health, safety, the environment and social justice").
129.
Id.
261, 263 (finding no "open-ended mandate to second-guess" the
controversial policy choices of the NAFTA Parties and recognizing the "high measure of
deference that international law generally extends to . . . domestic authorities to
regulate matters within their ... borders"); Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note
127, 99 (mentioning the need to exercise "special care" when evaluating challenges to
the Partial Award, exercise of "police powers"); see also Feldman, Award, supra note
127,
103 (concluding that "governments must be free to act in the broader public
interest through protection of the environment ... and the like").
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those rights.' 3 0 Thus, tribunals seem to appreciate the growing
support for ESCRs and have created a mechanism that gives the
holders of ESCRs a measure of standing to protect their interests.
Given the increasing support for ESCRs, one may next predict
that tribunals will tend to reject claims based on liberty rights (e.g.,
expropriation, performance requirements, and violations of the
minimum standard not involving discrimination) that might set
absolute limits on states' efforts to promote ESCRs. Conversely,
because they do not threaten to place absolute limits on regulatory

action and because they conform to ESCRs' pursuit of equality, one
may also predict that tribunals will more frequently sustain
complaints founded on allegations of discriminatory treatment (e.g.,
denials of national treatment). Again, the limited experience to date
tends to confirm these theses.
As of this writing, Chapter 11 tribunals have rendered partial or
final awards in nine disputes. 131 Although claimants have alleged
expropriation in seven of those disputes, six of the seven tribunals

130.
See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, Decision of Tribunal on
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae,
13, 70, 73 (Oct. 17, 2001,
NAFTA[UNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (involving the petition of
Canadian postal workers who might be affected by claims challenging the operation of
Canada's national mail service, recognizing the "considerable cogency" with which they
illustrated "the important public character of the matters in issue ...

and ...

their real

interest in these matters," and concluding that Chapter 11 tribunals have the power to
accept amicus submissions); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal
on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae,
5, 8, 49, 52-53 (Jan. 15,
2001, NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (involving the
petitions of environmental groups, referring to "the immense public importance of the
case and the critical impact that the Tribunal's decision will have on environmental and
other public welfare law-making in the NAFTA region," recording the contention "that
the outcome in this case might affect the willingness of governments . . . to implement
measures to protect the environment and human health," recognizing the "public interest
in this arbitration . . . as powerfully suggested in the [p]etitions," and expressing an
inclination to accept amicus submissions later in the proceedings).
131.
See generally Lowen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award (June 6, 2003,
NAFTA/ICSTID Add'l Facility), availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
Lowen, Award]; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Award (Jan. 9, 2003,
NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
ADF, Award]; Feldman, Award, supra note 127; United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v.
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (Nov. 22, 2002, NAFTAIUNCITRAL), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter UPS, Award on Jurisdiction]; Mondev Int'l
Ltd. v. United States, Award (Oct. 11, 2002, NAFTAIICSID Add'l Facility), available
at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Mondev, Award]; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Award on the
Merits of Phase 2]; S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 60; Pope & Talbot, Interim
Award, supra note 127; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award (Sept. 2, 2000)
(NAFTA/ICSID Add'l Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
Metalclad, Award]; Azinian v. Mexico, Award (Nov. 1, 1999) (NAFTA/ICSID Add'l
Facility), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter Azinian, Award].

2003J

NAFTA 'S INVESTMENT CHAPTER

have rejected those claims either on jurisdictional grounds 32 or on
the merits. 133 Likewise, although three claimants accused their host
states of imposing unlawful performance requirements, tribunals
rejected all of those claims. 134 In contrast, while six investors have
advanced claims based on the denial of national treatment, tribunals
rejected those claims on the merits in three cases 135 and sustained
them on the merits in two others. 136 In the remaining two cases, one
tribunal upheld a national treatment claim against a jurisdictional
challenge, 137 and the other tribunal did not. 138 Thus, consistent with

132.
See Loewen, Award, supra note 131, $T 141, 230-39; Mondev, Award, supra
note 131, 7 47-48, 56-62.
133.
See Loewen, Award, supra note 131, $$ 141, 207-17; Feldman, Award,
supranote 127, 77 111, 152; S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 60, $$ 279-88; Pope
& Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 127, $$ 96-105; Azinian, Award, supra note 131,
100. Several writers have emphasized the fact that Chapter 11 tribunals have denied
all but one claim for expropriation. See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 285; Been &
Beauvais, supra note 2, at 59; Soloway & Broadhurst, supra note 116, at 395; Lilley,
supranote 2, at 731; see also Brower, A Tale of Fearand Equilibrium,supra note 60, at
71 (predicting that "investors will face great difficulty in establishing claims for
'regulatory takings' and even greater obstacles to the assertion of expropriation claims
directed at the exercise of police powers").
134.
See ADF Group, Award, supra note 131, T$ 159-74; S.D. Myers, Partial
Award, supra note 60, 77 277-78; Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 127,
$$ 75, 80. But see S.D. Myers, Partial Award (separate opinion of Bryan Schwartz),
supra note 60,
193 (concluding that, by prohibiting the export of PCBs, Canada
effectively required remediation to take place in Canada, thereby establishing a
required level of "Canadian content").
135.
See Loewen, Award, supra note 131, TT 139-40; ADF Group, Award, supra
note 131, $T 156-58; Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 131,
$T 88, 93-95, 97, 100-04.
136.
See Feldman, Award, supra note 127, $T 173-88; S.D. Myers, Partial
Award, supra note 60, $$ 255-56.
137.
See UPS, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 131, TT 100-03.
138.
See Mondev, Award, supra note 131, 77 63-65. Characterization of the
success and failure of claims involving the minimum standard of treatment presents a
more complex task. In each of the nine claims listed above, investors alleged violations
of the minimum standard. Six of the nine tribunals denied the claims either on
jurisdictional grounds or on the merits. See Loewen, Award, supra note 131, $T 207-17
(merits), 220-39 (jurisdiction); ADF, Award, supra note 131, $T 187-92 (merits);
Feldman, Award, supra note 127,
141 (jurisdiction); UPS, Award on Jurisdiction,
supra note 131, 77 71-99 (jurisdiction); Mondev, Award, supra note 131, 77 128-56
(merits); Azinian, Award, supra note 131, $$ 92, 97-120 (merits).
Although tribunals found violations not involving discrimination in two of the
remaining cases, one involved retaliation by the host state against the investor for
commencing the arbitration. Compare Metalclad, Award, supra note 131, TT 74-101
(finding that the host state violated the minimum standard because federal officials
represented that the investor did not require a local construction permit, the local
government required the investor to apply for a construction permit, the local
government used arbitrary procedures to consider the application, and the local
government denied the application for arbitrary reasons), with Pope & Talbot, Award
on the Merits of Phase 2, supra note 131, 77 156-81 (finding that the host state
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growing support for ESCRs, Chapter 11 tribunals have shown great
reluctance to impose absolute limits on state action, but fewer
139
inhibitions in demanding respect for principles of equal treatment.
Given the increasing support for ESCRs, one may finally predict
that the NAFTA parties will vigorously seek annulment of awards
that disregard their arguments about the public health dimensions of
challenged measures. Again, the limited experience to date tends to
confirm this thesis. After a tribunal held that restrictions on the
operation of a hazardous waste facility constituted a measure
"tantamount to expropriation" and a denial of fair and equitable
treatment, 140 the Mexican government sought and, in part, obtained
a level of judicial review not contemplated by Chapter 11.141 In
seeking to justify this controversial step, Mexico's counsel publicly
complained that the award failed to acknowledge several of Mexico's
principal contentions, including its allegation that previous owners
had dumped some 20,000 metric tons of untreated hazardous waste
at the site, thereby creating a serious possibility of explosion and
other health risks. 142 By the same token, Mexico's counsel suggested
that his client would have been much less upset, 143 and the reviewing
court would have been less inclined to disturb the award, 144 if the

violated the minimum standard by conducting a vindictive regulatory audit after
initiation of the arbitration proceedings).
In the final case, the tribunal found that the host state's discriminatory treatment
of the investor violated both the obligation of national treatment and the minimum
255-56, 266. It
standard of treatment. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 60,
is worth noting that in the two cases involving denials of national treatment, both
tribunals have shown an inclination to find violations of the minimum standard of
109 n.9, 141, 188
treatment. See id; see also Feldman, Award, supra note 127,
(finding a denial of national treatment and recognizing that "there may be an
argument for a violation of [the minimum standard] under the facts of this case," but
concluding that NAFTA excludes tax measures from the jurisdiction of tribunals over
claims involving the minimum standard). This tends to confirm the willingness of
tribunals to impose liability in claims involving credible allegations of discrimination.
139.
See Beauvais, supra note 2, at 285-86 (observing that national treatment
claims "by comparison, have had greater overall success" than expropriation claims).
140.
See Metalclad, Award, supra note 131,
74-101, 104, 109, 111.
141.
See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 3, at 51-88 (identifying and
criticizing this phenomenon).
142.
See Thomas, supra note 73, at 436, 439, 440 n.34; Thomas, supra note 85,
at 5-7.
143.
See Thomas, supra note 73, at 436.
144.
See Thomas, supra note 85, at 6 (describing the award's "extraordinary
brevity" as the "central problem that Metalclad faced in defending [it] on judicial
review"); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards:
Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 20 J. INT'L
ARB. 185, 191 n.43 (2003) (recognizing that "the failure of the Metalclad award to
emerge unscathed from Judge Tysoe's court had much to do with the economical
presentation of reasons to be found in the award"). Professor Coe represented the
investor in Metalclad.
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tribunal had addressed in detail the public health dimensions of
Mexico's submissions.
Thus, for Chapter 11 disputes, one may divide the practical
implications of changing attitudes toward CPRs and ESCRs into two
categories: those that affect litigation strategy and those that affect
decision making strategy. With regard to the former, claimants
should recognize that credible allegations of discriminatory treatment
enjoy a much higher likelihood of success than claims based on the
violation of liberty rights.1 45 Likewise, if their claims arguably
implicate ESCRs, investors should anticipate that they will draw
amicus submissions, which tribunals will probably receive, and which
may significantly increase the scope and cost of arbitration.1 46 With
regard to decision making strategy, Chapter 11 tribunals should
address in detail attempts by host states to justify their measures as
tools necessary for the promotion of ESCRs. Failure to do so will
invite-and may ensure the success of-vigorous petitions for judicial
14 7
review.
B. Implicationsfor the Integrationof ESCRs into the Mainstreamof
InternationalLaw
In the abstract, one can hardly doubt the significance of
changing attitudes toward CPRs and ESCRs exposed by the
application of Chapter 11. Concretely speaking, however, one
struggles to describe how this phenomenon will affect the integration
of ESCRs into the mainstream of international law. On one hand, one
should not overstate the conclusions that may be drawn from limited
data. For example, the application of Chapter 11 has shown
widespread support for the right to health among the people and
government of the United States? 48 It has not, at least as of this
writing, revealed the level of support for other rights, such as the
rights to work, social security, adequate food and shelter, education,
or to take part in cultural life. 149 Likewise, the application of Chapter

145.
See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
146.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
147.
See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
148.
See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
149.
One should at least consider the argument that, among ESCRs, the right to
health enjoys a uniquely high level of acceptance in the United States. Although
international treaties typically characterize the right to health as an ESCR, it is
possible that people in the United States embrace this right because, in some respects,
it promotes liberty. Although public health measures may restrict liberty for members
of the regulated community, the beneficiaries of the measures may see them as a form
of liberation from the harmful effects of industry. Cf. Shelton, supra note 19, at 112
(explaining that environmental deterioration threatens both ESCRs, such as the rights
to health, suitable working conditions, and an adequate standard of living, and CPRs,
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11 has shown that the U.S. government supports the right to health
when set against the liberty rights of foreign investors. 150 It has not,
however, disclosed the extent to which the government will support
the right to health when set against the liberty rights of U.S. citizens.
Nor can we predict the level of support for U.S. citizens who might
assert the right to health (or other ESCRs) against their own
government. In short, one could find many reasons to discount the
extent to which the application of Chapter 11 has advanced the
prospects for integrating ESCRs into the mainstream of international
law.
On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
greatest opponent of ESCRs has essentially asserted the right to
health before an international tribunal, 151 and that some of its
officials recognize the folly of clinging to an eighteenth-century view
of individual rights. 152 Also, tribunals have responded to growing
support for ESCRs and have granted a measure of standing to the
bearers of those rights.15 3 Furthermore, this assertion and
recognition of ESCRs in adversarial proceedings at the international
level does not represent an isolated phenomenon. To the contrary, the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights lately has begun
to follow a similar path. 154 Likewise, a distinguished international

such as the rights to life and privacy); Shelton, supra note 23, at 942 n.35 (observing
that one may characterize environmental harm as an invasion of the rights to privacy,
home and family life); cf. also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (discussing the concept of "private nuisance" and using
terms like "freedom from discomfort and annoyance," "freedom from physical
interruption with ...use," and "freedom from detrimental change in the physical
condition of. . . land"). On the other hand, the right to health does not seem unique in
this regard because all ESCRs theoretically liberate people from private exploitation.
See Marks, supra note 5, at 438 (explaining that the "social upheavals of the
nineteenth century against the exploitation arising from abuses of the rights of the
first generation ...

led to the emergence of a ... second generation of human rights, a

generation of economic, social, and cultural rights"); see also L.T. HOBHOUSE,
LIBERALISM 78 (1964) (opining that the "function of State coercion is to override
individual coercion"); KELLEY, supra note 5, at 31 (recognizing the common perception
that "the welfare state emerged as a response to the harsher aspects of industrial
capitalism").
Alternatively, the long history of causes of action for nuisance may support public
acceptance of the idea that people have individual, enforceable rights to health. See
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 821B(2)(a) & cmt. a (defining "public nuisance" to include
"significant interference with the public health" and recognizing that private rights of
action have existed since the sixteenth century), § 821D & cmt. a (defining "private
nuisance" and observing that the right of action originated in the twelfth century).
150.
See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
151.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120, 124 and accompanying text.
152.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
153.
154.
See Shelton, supra note 23, at 941-42 (describing the first instance in which
a human rights body decided a contentious case "involving violations of nearly all
categories of rights," referring to it as a "sweeping decision on the duties of African
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arbitrator recently suggested that "the protection of public health or
cultural sites ... might in future achieve preference over pacta sunt
155
servanda in the hierarchy of international public policy."
Therefore, he deemed it "essential" for his counterparts to "remain
abreast with and [to] respect developments in national and
international public policy[,] and to recognize that . . . public policy
might include new issues such as environmental policy and human
rights norms." 156 Thus, despite the qualifications and uncertainties
already mentioned, one may at least discern a trend sustaining the
prediction "that 21st-century jurisprudence will focus increasingly on
157
socio-economic rights.'

V. CONCLUSION

Engrossed in sharp debates about NAFTA's investment chapter,
observers have missed an important and surprising development:
Although the treaty's text reflects the traditional U.S. preference for
liberty rights over ESCRs, its application has revealed a competition
in which the latter seem to be gaining ground. Recent statements by
the media, civil society, academics, and the U.S. government all
suggest an astonishingly high level of suspicion concerning the liberty
rights created by Chapter 11 and an unexpectedly high level of
support for ESCRs. 158 Stated abstractly, this may signal an erosion of
the United States' longstanding hostility toward ESCRs. Although
one might be tempted to discount the practical implications of this
development, the evidence warrants at least three conclusions. First,
Chapter 11 tribunals have responded to changing attitudes in
constructive ways, for example by providing a measure of standing to
the holders of ESCRs and by rendering awards that show greater
concern for equality than for liberty. 159 Second, a growing body of
practice and opinion suggests that ESCRs can play a more prominent
role in the development of international law. 160 Third, and most
importantly, if that is to happen, decision makers will require more

states to ensure respect for economic, social, and cultural rights," and recognizing the
"potential ... impact on human rights law and practice well beyond Africa").
155.
Cremades & Cairns, supra note 63, at 206.
156.
Id. at 208.
157.
Sachs, supra note 22, at 1387; see also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note
12, at 276-77 (identifying "a tendency ... to pay increasing attention to economic and
social rights").
158.
See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
159.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
160.
Id.
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than today's "meager" body of relevant scholarship. 161 One hopes that
others will build on these initial thoughts.

161.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

